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THE 'OPERATING PREMISES' EXCEPTION
TO THE GOING AND COMING RULE
By liciAR_ D. CooPER*
One of the most litigious events in workmen's compensation
law occurs when the employee is traveling to or from work and
is injured with some circumstances connecting his work with the
time, place or occurrence of the accident. The conflict of the
existence of a work connected circumstance and the fact that the
risks of going and coming to and from work are related to all
occupations and all non-occupational travel make it difficult to
resolve whether such injuries should be compensable.
The purpose of this article is to review the decisions of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals to determine how the Court disposes
of such cases, and to suggest some guidelines which the Court
might find useful in deciding such cases in the future.
THE. EvOLuI-ON OF A DocTRNAL APPROACH
The Workmen's Compensation Act of Kentucky requires that
an employee must receive an injury "arising out of and in the
course of his employment" in order to be compensable. 1 These
dual requirements have traditionally been construed as separate
and independent requirements for compensation. In its initial
interpretation of them, the Court of Appeals said:
The words, 'in the course of employment have reference to
the time, place, and circumstances [activity], while the words
'arising out of' the employment relate to the cause or source
of the accident. The terms 'out of' and 'in the course of are
* LL.B., Univ. of Kentucky, 1959; partner, Reeves, Barret, Cooper and Ward,
Hazard, Kentucky.
IKy. EBv. STAT. [hereinafter KRS] § 342.005(1) (1962).
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not synonymous, and if either of these two elements is missing,
there can be no recovery.2
The Court also adopted the general going and coming rule
construction of this statutory phrase; i.e. an employee who is
going to or coming from his employment is usually not then "in
the course of [his] employment, hence an injury which occurs
then is not compensable."3 However, many exceptions have been
applied to the going and coming rule,4 and one of the principle
exceptions widely applied throughout the nation is that injuries
sustained by an employee while going to or from his place of work
upon premises owned or controlled by his employer are generally
deemed to have occurred "in the course of employment."5
Making compensable those injuries which occur on the em-
ployer's premises though the employee is going to or coming
from work appears initially to be a definite, and therefore easily
applied, rule. And where the premises are a single building it is
easily applied, even to the steps where the employees and public
alike enter and exit.6 However, this exception created great
difficulty since the property of the employer may cover a large
area, as is generally true with respect to coal mines. In its early
decisions, the Court simply applied the premises exception with-
out regard to the size of the premises, so that it was a compensable
injury when an employee stumbled while going from the coal
mine tipple where he worked to the company-owned house where
he lived.7 This expansive application of the premises exception
2 Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 280-81, 204 S.W. 152,
159-60 (1918).
3 Miracle v. Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp., 311 Ky. 169, 223 S.W.2d 738 (1949);
Draper v. Railway Accessories Co., 300 Ky. 597 189 S.W.2d 934 (1945); Porter
v. Stoll Oil Refining Co., 242 Ky. 392, 46 S.W.2d 510 (1932).
- See g Nugent Sand Co. v. Hargesheiner, 254 Ky. 358, 71 S.W.2d 647
(1934) (em;ployee injured while going to do errands as directed at supervisor's
home); State Highway Comm. v. Saylor, 252 Ky. 743, 68 S.W.2d 26 (1933)
(transportation customarily furnished by employer); Turner Day and Woolworth
Handle Co. v. Rennington, 250 Ky. 433, 63 S.W.2d 490 (1933) (transportation
paid by employer); Palmer v. Main, 209 Ky. 226, 272 S.W. 736 (1925) (injury
occurring while in transit on a special errand). But see Taylor v. Taylor Tire Co.,
285 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1955) (car furnished, but trip securing different employ-
ment). See generally 7 A. LAwsoN, Tirm LAws OF WORKmEN's COMPENSATION § 15
et. seq. (1952); Note, Workmen's Compensation-The "Going and Coming" Rule
and Its Exceptions in Kentucky, 47 Ky. L.J. 420, 425-28 (1959).
5 See generally Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1043, 1044 (1933).
6 See e.g., Barres v. Watterson, 196 Ky. 100, 244 S.W. 308 (1922).
7Wilson Berger Coal Co. v. Brown, 223 Ky. 183, 3 S.W.2d 199 (1928). See
also Black Mountain Corp. v. Vaugn, 280 Ky. 271, 132 S.W.2d 938 (1939) (coal
(Continued on next page)
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was seen as less than desirable and the Court thereafter groped for
an alternative rule. The difficulty of this task was underscored by
Larson's statement that ".... if some other point between entering
the premises and picking up the broom is to be the starting point,
it is difficult to imagine how that point can be successfully
defined.""
There followed, therefore, a series of cases in which the Court
reached sound results without being able to formulate the
expression of a rationale both applicable to all those cases and
sufficiently sound to be hardened into a repeated decisional basis.
First, the Court continued to find presence on premises limited to
a single building to afford compensation.' However, in Harlan
Collieries Co. v. Shell 0 the Court reversed a grant of compen-
sation to a coal miner injured in a truck accident while going from
work though still on premises owned by his employer, saying that
workmen's compensation laws are only "designed to indemnify
the employee from financial loss resulting from exposure to
industrial hazards."-" The Court refined this view in Clear Fork
Coal Co. v. Roberts'2 stating that the element required for com-
pensability was that the employee be engaged in a work-connected
activity when injured. In Roberts, as in Shell, the coal miner was
traversing a road on the employer's premises. Rather than leav-
ing, however, he was going to work after having dressed for his
job at the company bath house. Having thus initiated his work,
the ride was deemed a work-connected activity. This "work con-
nected activity" approach, as distinguished from a pure "premises
exception," not only permitted denying recovery to an employee
on the employer's premises, as in Shell, it also had already allowed
the granting of compensation by "extending the premises" beyond
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
miner killed riding on loaded cars from barn to head house); Harlan Gas Coal Co.
v. Trial, 213 Ky. 226, 280 S.W. 954 (1926) (coal miner walking from bath house
to place of work); and Big Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Burke, 206 Ky. 489, 267 S.W. 142
(1924) (coal miner killed while on way to outside of mine).
8 1 A. LARSON, Tim LAws oF WoRKMEN's COUPENSATION, §15.11 (1952).
9 King v. Lexington Herald, 313 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. 1958). See also Jefferson
County Stone Co. v. Bettler, 199 S.W.2d 986 (Ky. 1947) (nightwatchman killed
in fire of his home furnished on the premises). But see Masonic Widows and
Orphans Home v. Lewis, 830 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1959) (cleaning lady injured in
furnished living quarters located away from area of her work).
10239 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. 1951).
11 Id. at 926 (emphasis added). For other cases of injuries on large premises
held not to be compensable, see Note, supra note 4, at 422 n. 14.
12 279 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. 1955).
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the actual property line. In Louisville and Jefferson County Air
Board v. Riddle,"3 for example, compensation was awarded an
employee for injuries sustained in crossing a highway to the gate
of the airfield where he was employed. After alighting from the
bus which he customarily rode to work, the employee, a mainte-
nance man, would daily check landing lights maintained by his
employer before crossing the road to work. He was consequently
engaged in work connected activity before arriving on the actual
premises and was thus then in the course of his employment.
Thus, as these cases show, without yet evolving the appellation
"operating premises," the Court had evolved the approach that
would bear that name; that the crucial point of determining
compensability is the nature, not the location, of the activity.
THE EFFEcT OF TmE PosrrioNAL BRi DocTmE
The event which apparently marked the increased cogency
of the Court's analysis was the celebrated decision in Corken v.
Corken Steel Products, Inc.14 to adopt what Larson denominates
the positional risk doctrine. In Corken, a traveling employee
returning from a restaurant to his automobile was killed without
provocation by an apparently deranged stranger. The Workmen's
Compensation Board denied recovery in a 3-2 decision which
was affirned by the Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals reversed,
overruling Lexington Railway System v. True."5 The test which
Judge Palmore erected in writing for the Court was that "the
causal connection is sufficient if the exposure [to the risk] results
from the employment." 6 The Court thus adopted Larson's classi-
cal reasoning that the salesman's employment was the cause of the
injury since it was the cause of his presence at what turned out
to be a place of danger.
The Corken opinion and the rationale of the positional risk
doctrine refer to the factor of causal connection between the
injury and the employment, a factor customarily construed as
being required by the "arising out of' rather than the "in the
3. 301 Ky. 100, 190 S.W.2d 1009 (1945).
14 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1964).
15276 Ky. 446, 124 S.W.2d 467 (1939).
16 385 S.W.2d at 950.
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course of' facet of the compensation law.' The positional risk
doctrine assumes that the worker was "in the course of his
employment," for the theory of the doctrine is that if the employee
is required by his employment to be in the place which turns out
to have been dangerous, i.e., if he is there while engaged in a
work-connected activity, the injury sustained is compensable.
18
Interestingly, this closely approximates the approach and lan-
guage which the Court of Appeals used while trying to forge a
workable premises exception to the going and coming rule,19 a
concept based upon the "in the course of' requirement.20 And, it
is the view the Court ultimately adopted as a premises exception,
the so-called "operating premises" exception to the going and
coming rule, by saying "if we interpret work-connected activity
as including work-connected place, we really reach a concept of
operating premises."21
Thus by adopting a singular approach to both facets, the Court
in effect merged that "arising out of" facet with the very important
going and coming portion of the "in the course of" requirement.
But, to say that such a merger distorts the going and coming rule
would be to forget the rationale of that rule.
The theory for excluding employees from the benefits of
workmen's compensation while 'going to or coming from work'
is that they are not performing any service for their employer
and are exposed to risk, not as employees, but rather as
members of the general public.22
Obviously, if the employees are engaged in a work-connected
activity, they are "performing [a] service for their employer and
are exposed to the risk.., as employees," not "as members of the
general public." It should be noted that this negative statement
of the going and coming rule is also a statement of the positional
risk doctrine.
17Corken v. Corken Steel Products, Inc., 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1964).18 See text accompanying notes 14 and 15 supra.
19 See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
2 0 See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
21 Smith v. Kiarer Co., 405 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. 1966). This rationale, language,
and the label 'operating premises' were suggested by this author in Note, supranote 4, at 423-24.
22 Note, supra note 4, at 420.
1970]
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The new formulation of an operating premises doctrine as a
merger of doctrines based upon the supposedly separate require-
ments of compensability is only a part of the emasculating effect
which Corken's adoption of the positional risk doctrine has had
on these requirements. Indeed, the application of the positional
risk concept leads to the conclusion that the Court is permitting
a presumption to be raised in favor of the employee that his
accident arose out of his employment and that the employer
must rebut this presumption. Except in a case of private malice
as the exciting cause of the injury,23 the Court's application of
the positional risk doctrine effectively does away with the require-
ment that the injury must be one both "arising out of and in the
course of employment. . . ." Its occurrence "in the course of
employment," i.e. while engaged in a work-connected activity,
is, in effect, deemed sufficient. The clearest example of this logic
of the Court is Coomes v. Robertson Lumber Company.2 4 In
that case a workman unloading a truck was seen falling with what
was later determined to be a head injury, but no one saw the
cause of the injury. The Court held that "arising out of and in
the course of employment" are tandem requirements of work-
connection with the strength of one able to suffice for the weak-
ness of the other. This view, coupled with the statutorily man-
dated liberal construction of the Act,23 thus require that "a rebut-
table presumption ... arises when an employee is found unex-
plainably injured on his employer's premises in the course of
employment."
26
Conversely, the "tandem requirements of work connection"
approach mentioned in Coomes is evidenced where the statutory
facet slightly satisfied is that the employee be "in the course of
employment." In Blue Diamond Coal Company v. Creech 2 7 an
employee was killed on a public highway an hour and a half after
qutting time. He had stopped at the company commissary before
23 E.g., January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S.W.2d 117 (Ky.
1929) (a nightwatchman killed while making his rounds, but by the watchman's
wife's lover). See also City of Prestonsburg v. Gray, 341 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1960)
(city fire chief on 24 hr. call killed in his apartment provided above the fire
station, shot by a former fire chief whose resentment of the decendent was clearly
shown).
24427 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1968).
25 KRS § 342.004 (1962).
26 427 S.W.2d at 811.
27 411 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1967).
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departing, but was killed while passing through a picket line at
the highway. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court,
which had reversed a denial of workmen's compensation by the
Workmen's Compensation Board. The Court applied the posi-
tional risk rule of Corken and reasoned that the exposure of being
killed by pickets was a result of employment. Obviously, the
Court stretched the premises beyond the property line of the
employer and extended the "operating premises" concept to make
the employee's death compensable because of the strong "arising
out of" element, i.e. the strong causal connection between the
employee's death and his employment. The employee was not
engaged in the activity for which he was employed. Indeed, he
had delayed his departure for purely personal reasons. But his
activity was nevertheless work-connected because his exposure
to the risk of the pickets at his point of departure was caused by
(arose out of) his employment.28 So, the Coomes approach
operates inversely here, again illustrating that the decisional
thrust in these cases is a properly liberal construction of the Act.
Thus, this singular view of compensability effectively reads
the statutory clause as "arising [occurring]-out of and in the
course of [during]-employment [a work-connected activity]."
And considering that the purpose of the statute is to have industry
compensate for its human as well as material costs, to have the
Act be a promoter of, rather than barrier to, recovery,29 this is not
an inappropriate construction.
THE OPERATING PnInSEs DocrmNE
Another important consequence of the transformation wrought
by Corken in creating a singular approach to the question of
compensability is to make of paramount importance the question
of whether a person was engaged in a work-connected activity
when injured. The answer to this question is most obscure when
the employee is going to or coming from work. Thus, the doctrine
28 Compare Meo v. Commercial Can Corp 184 A.2d 891 (1962) aff'd 192
A.2d 854 (1963) (compensation granted a strike-breaking plant manager badly
beaten at his home, apparently by striking employees).
2 9 See e.g., KRS § 342.004 (1962) which requires that the Act be 'liberally
construed on questions of law ....
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the Court has denominated the "operating premises" exception
to the going and coming rule is of considerable importance.
But, a review of several cases decided with reference to the
label "operating premises" will show that the point of decision
is the aforementioned liberal construction of the Act reflected in
the opinions in Corken, Coomes and Creech. In reviewing these
cases, two things should be particularly noted: first, the point of
decision in these cases is really not the premises occupied but
the activity involved; and secondly, the term "operating premises"
consequently represents a conclusion, rather than a method of
determining, that an injury is compensable. The Court first
referred to the "operating premises" exception in Ratliff v.
Eppling.80 In that case an employee of an auger and strip mine
company was injured approximately 170 feet from the drift mouth
where he actually performed his work. The accident occurred
sometime after he had finished his day's work. The Court applied
an "operating premises" concept and said that 173 feet from the
drift mouth should properly have been considered within the
operating premises of the employer. However, the Court denied
recovery because the employee had deviated from his employment
since the accident happened 30 minutes after quitting time while
he was gathering loose coal for his personal use and this deviation
contributed to his injury. The Court adopted the operating
premises concept in Smith v. Klarer Company.81 In that case an
employee fell on a sidewalk in front of his employer's meat pack-
ing plant on his way to work. The Court reversed the Circuit
Court's judgment which had set aside an award of compensation
by the Workmen's Compensation Board. The Court defined
"operating premises" by stating "if we interpret work-connected
activity as including work-connected place, we really reach a
concept of operating premises."82 This, of course, was a marked
improvement in approach to Ratliff's concern with the definite
ideas of distance from the actual work site.
Other examples of the doctrine's application occur on adjacent
premises similar to the sidewalk in Klarer. Foremost among them
are the parking lots owned by the employer which employees
30401 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1966).
81405 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. 1966).
82 Id. at 737.
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traverse daily in the act of arriving and departing which is inci-
dental to their employment. An injury sustained in a fall on such
a parking lot was held with application of the label "operating
premises" to be compensable in Harlan Appalachian Regional
Hospitals v. Taylor.a3
Another type case under the umbrella of the "operating
premises" concept is travel necessitated by the employment,
which by definition places the employee more within the course
of his employment than in cases such as Creech, Taylor, and
Klarer. Even thirty years ago, recovery would be granted for the
death of a traveling salesman in a hotel fire because of the obvious
connection with his work. 4 Similarly, if an employee usually
employed in one city is required to work the following day in
another city and is injured in a traffic accident while traveling
to that city, the injury is compensable though it occurs in his
off-duty hours while traveling in a vehicle of his own choice.35
The cases become a little less clear when the travel is not
necessitated by, but is nevertheless related to, the employment
For example, in the most recent case applying the operating
premises concept, Kaycee Coal Company v. Short,63 a vice-presi-
dent was killed in an automobile accident on his way in the
company truck from home to work. The truck had certain tools
of the company in it at the time of the accident. Moreover, the
company furnished him with a telephone and office equipment
which he maintained at his home. The Court referred to the
positional risk doctrine and said that his home was a part of the
operating premises since it was one of the places where he dis-
charged his employment. Thus, he was merely traveling from one
area of the operating premises to another when he met his death.
The difficulty associated with the auto accident cases is well
illustrated in Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Short. 7 In
that case a veterinarian left a trace track with certain information
33424 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1968), overruling Bickel v. Ford Motor Co., 370
S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1963). For the classic, peculiar risk rationale of the earlier cases
denying recovery in parking lot cases, see Maddox v. Heaven Hill Distilleries, 329
S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1959).84 StandardOil Co. v. Witt, 283 Ky. 327, 141 S.W.2d 271 (1940).
85 Black v. Tichenor, 396 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1965). Compare Petro, Inc. v.
Baley, 438 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. 1968).
36 450 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1970).
37433 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1968).
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to be delivered to his supervisor. However, his itinerary and
destination were disputed. The majority denied recovery, saying
he was not "in the course of" his employment when the accident
occurred. The proper view of the case was taken by the three
dissenting judges who would have afforded coverage because the
employee was serving his employer by protecting the information.
An interesting analogy would be to change the item in the em-
ployee's possession from information to money, a day's receipts,
for example. A similar, but properly decided, case is Hall v. Spur-
lock. In that case the employee customarily brought groceries
for his fellow workers who lived at the job site when he returned
from his weekend trips home. Though this service was voluntary,
and though the injury occurred while he was going home for the
weekend rather than returning with the groceries, the injury was
held compensable on the view that the employer's acquiescence
in this procedure made the employee's weekend trips home a
"service incidental to the operation of the sawmill."3 9
SoMM CONCLUDMG SUGGESTIONS
In sum, the operating premises doctrine is the label affixed
to the judicial approach of determining the compensability of a
workmen's injury incurred while going to or coming from work
with the single question of whether it occurred from a work-
connected activity. This doctrinal statement is so ambiguous as
to enlist unanimity of support for a simple statement of it, but
dissension as to its application in given cases. And this ambiguity
is reflected in the lack of guidelines erected by the Court to aid
bench and bar.
Of course, the disposition of any case at law requires flexibility
in the principles for use in the decision and the suggestion of
guidelines should not be construed as an attempt to straitjacket
the Court. Rather, what is needed is a statement of factors which
are to be considered in determining whether the employee's
injurious activity was work-connected, similar to the factors
mentioned in Home v. Gregg40 for consideration in determining
38310 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1957).
39 Id. at 261.
40 279 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1955).
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whether a worker is a servant or an independent contractor.
Among factors which could be usefully considered are:
1) Whether the employee was, at the time of the injury, on
premises owned by the employer;
2) the size of the premises, if owned by the employer;
3) whether the premises are controlled by the employer,
whether owned by the employer or not;
4) the proximity in time and distance from the premises
where the employee discharges his work duties;
5) whether the employee was performing some service of
benefit to the employer at the time of the injury; and
6) whether the injury is causally related to a work-connected
event, irrespective of the place of its occurrence.
The application of such guidelines should be of considerable
benefit in determining whether an employee injured while going
to or coming from work is entitled to compensation. Certain cases
are, of course, clear. The employee at his station doing his
assigned task incurs a compensable injury from even so unrelated
a cause as a madman. The employee traveling from home to work
with no other circumstances of work-connection would not be
covered against an assault by the same madman. The guidelines
are needed for the gray cases where there is a nebulous or rela-
tively weak circumstance of work-connection.
However, despite the absence of guidelines one thing is clear,
the Court of Appeals has been very liberal toward finding injuries
to be compensable and should guard against further extension
of the exception to the going and coming rule. For while social
insurance against the human costs of industrialization may be a
construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act consistent with
the public sentiment that produced it, it would be improper to
construe it as a national accident insurance program against the
hazards of traffic and madmen-with the premiums paid by one's
employer.
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